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Spatial thinking is a vital component of the science, technology, engineering, and mathematics curriculum.
However, to date, broad development of learning environments that target domain-specific spatial thinking is
incomplete. The present article visits the problem of improving spatial thinking by first reviewing the evidence
that the human mind is embodied: that cognition, memory, and knowledge representation maintain traces of
sensorimotor impressions from acting and perceiving in a physical environment. In particular, we review the
evidence that spatial cognition and the ways that humans perceive and conceive of space are embodied.
We then propose a set of design principles to aid researchers, designers, and practitioners in creating and
evaluating learning environments that align principled embodied actions to targets of spatial thinking in science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics.Significance
This work brings what we know about learning with the
body to the design of learning environments for spatial
thinking. Spatial thinking is important at all levels of sci-
ence, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM)
and students who struggle to understand the relation-
ship between space and their chosen discipline are less
likely to pursue STEM careers. The article addresses the
critical issue of curriculum reform in STEM by synthe-
sizing theoretical and empirical work across psychology,
neuroscience, and the learning sciences to propose prin-
ciples for design that can guide efforts to produce novel
curricula.Background
Spatial thinking is a central component of the science,
technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) cur-
riculum (Newcombe, 2010). In beginning and advanced* Correspondence: ddesut2@uic.edu
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lationships and their changes over time impact physical
and biological systems. This type of thinking can range
in complexity from comparably simple (e.g., computing
the distance between two points in Cartesian space) to
substantially complex (e.g., predicting the way that large
macromolecules such as enzymes fold in order to inter-
act with other biomolecules). Despite the pervasive need
to think spatially across the curriculum, spatial thinking
is still largely an epiphenomenon of instruction. The lack
of direct attention to spatial thinking during teaching
and learning is problematic, given that the capacity to
reason accurately about spatial relationships and their
changes over time has been cited as a primary barrier to
success in STEM classrooms and to entry in STEM ca-
reers (Uttal et al., 2013). Recent research in psychology,
neuroscience, and the learning sciences suggests that
spatial thinking may be improved through instruction
that has students engage in spatial concepts and ways of
thinking with their bodies. Such instruction may be par-
ticularly potent toward improving spatial thinking givenis distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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about space is embodied.
Preparing the next generation of STEM professionals
requires critically examining and re-envisioning teaching
and learning settings so that spatial thinking is elevated
to a targeted objective of learning and is engendered as
an essential habit of mind (National Research Council,
2006). First and foremost, spatial thinking is exercised
extensively by experts: scientists across the STEM
spectrum regularly reason about the relationship be-
tween the concrete and theoretical entities they study,
their complex spatio-dynamic properties, and how these
properties give rise to macroscopic observations. The
ability to think spatially has led to some highly visible
and significant scientific breakthroughs (National Re-
search Council, 2006; Uttal & Cohen, 2012): Watson
and Crick’s construction of the DNA double helix,
Rutherford’s deduction of the presence of the nucleus,
and Pasteur’s account of light polarizing tartaric salts; all
represent discoveries that required extensive thought
about the relationship between space and the physical
properties of nature. Moreover, retaining and producing
more successful graduates in STEM disciplines repre-
sents an economic and strategic imperative shared
across OECD member countries (OECD, 2012). In the
USA, the Obama administration recently set a goal of
producing 1,000,000 new STEM graduates within the
next decade. Troublingly, of the students enrolling in
STEM degree programs, currently only 40% are follow-
ing these degrees to completion. Students leave the
STEM pipeline for myriad reasons, but challenges re-
lated to spatial thinking have been identified as an
important factor that contributes to their pursuit of
alternative careers (National Research Council, 2006;
Uttal et al., 2013).
The call for reform is clear and many learning envi-
ronments have emerged in which students are trained in
the critical aspects of spatial thinking. These learning
environments, which are physical and cultural contexts
engineered with the express purpose of facilitating the
attainment of target learning objectives by a specific
audience, vary vastly in their design principles. Where
some attempt to improve STEM outcomes by training
students in domain-general skills (Miller & Halpern,
2013; Sorby, 2009), others leverage domain-specific
tools, such as molecular models, to help students reason
about complex spatiotemporal dynamics (Stull, Hegarty,
Dixon, & Stieff, 2012). However, despite such efforts to
give students training in spatial thinking to improve out-
comes in the STEM classroom, these learning environ-
ments make different assumptions about the nature of
spatial thinking and, as such, propose substantially dif-
ferent solutions to support students as they learn to rea-
son about space. Given the variation in assumptions inthe literature, a fundamental question needs to be ad-
dressed: what exactly do we mean by spatial thinking?
On defining spatial thinking and its importance in the
curriculum
Researchers have historically focused on the relatively
narrow cognitive construct of spatial ability to quantify
human propensity to reason about space. Studies of
spatial ability grew out of a long history of psychometric
development in early psychology and this line of work
assumed that humans have some genetically determined
baseline capacity to perceive, mentally visualize, and ma-
nipulate spatial relationships. Research in this tradition
has argued that individual and group differences in
spatial ability are a prominent causal factor that can ac-
count for attrition in the STEM pipeline. This position
argues that students with low spatial ability are less able
to visualize and operate on the spatial relationships that
underlie disciplinary concepts in STEM and that this
negatively impacts these students very early in their
course of study (Uttal & Cohen, 2012; Wai, Lubinski, &
Benbow, 2009). A number of correlational studies have
attempted to establish the link between spatial ability
and spatial thinking in STEM by demonstrating correla-
tions between spatial ability and course-based achieve-
ment measures in physics (Kozhevnikov, Motes, &
Hegarty, 2007), chemistry (Bodner & McMillan, 1986;
Pribyl & Bodner, 1987), and geology (Kali & Orion,
1996) among many others (for a review cf. Hegarty,
2014). These findings have been further bolstered by
longitudinal analyses that show persistent relationships
between measures of spatial ability (e.g., mental rotation,
paper folding, and perspective taking) and the likelihood
an individual will perform well in STEM courses and
pursue a career path in STEM (Wai et al., 2009).
The logic goes that if individual differences in spatial
ability are in fact an important causal factor that cas-
cades through a student’s immediate success and later
career choice, students of lower spatial ability are select-
ively disadvantaged by current curricula and should be
supported through training targeted at improving indi-
vidual spatial ability. Recent meta-analytic work has pro-
vided further impetus for a focus on training spatial
ability, concluding that spatial ability is in fact responsive
to instruction (Uttal et al., 2013). Some notable studies
have even empirically demonstrated that training stu-
dents in domain-general spatial tasks positively corre-
lates with higher achievement scores on domain-specific
outcome measures (Small & Morton, 1983; Sorby, 2009).
However, despite the empirical rationale to design learn-
ing environments that teach domain-general spatial abil-
ity as a means to improve STEM achievement, critiques
against this line of work argue that correlations between
spatial ability and achievement remain weak to moderate
DeSutter and Stieff Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2017) 2:22 Page 3 of 20(r = 0.2 to 0.3; Hegarty, 2014). Moreover, extant work
has not clearly established that the relationship between
training spatial ability and STEM achievement is causal
(Stieff & Uttal, 2015). Even in studies where spatial abil-
ity is improved through sustained practice, the benefits
of the training do not transfer unilaterally across all
STEM disciplines and these benefits decline rapidly after
training (e.g., Miller & Halpern, 2013).
While traditional conceptions of spatial ability are
clearly related to STEM career choice and course
achievement, measures of spatial ability may simply
not capture the more complex forms of spatial think-
ing that characterize STEM curricula and the disci-
plines more broadly (National Research Council,
2006). In fact, although spatial ability is an independ-
ent predictor of performance and attainment in
STEM, this relationship does not hold for experts and
may not characterize the rich knowledge base that ex-
perts draw on (Uttal & Cohen, 2012). Hegarty (2014)
argued that the lack of clear causal evidence linking
increases on measures of spatial ability resulting from
training to improved performance in STEM disci-
plines opens the question of how spatial skills should
be taught: should the focus be on domain-general
skills such as mental rotation or do training studies
need to be designed around “… the context of spe-
cific [disciplinary] content (e.g., facility in rotating
molecules in chemistry)” (p. 151).
A broader interpretation of the cognitive components
that learners require to succeed as spatial thinkers may
be generative toward identifying the shared and domain-
specific challenges in the STEM curriculum. Such work
may also better identify instructional targets that can
mitigate the challenges learners have thinking spatially
that are not captured in domain-independent training
regimes. Spatial thinking is a more generalized construct
that “…is broader than spatial ability and related con-
cepts in that it approaches the process of problem solv-
ing via the coordinated use of space, representation, and
reasoning” (National Research Council, 2006, p. 27).
Spatial thinking in this sense acknowledges that con-
cepts of space are often drawn on by multiple disci-
plines, but that the application of spatial concepts is
entwined with discipline-specific practices. For example,
although engineers and mathematicians both reason
about the extent of objects in space, engineers might
do so in the context of a computer-assisted design
(CAD) application where they design precisely bal-
anced machine parts that they dynamically view from
multiple angles. A mathematician, on the other hand,
may use a numerical computation engine such as
MATLAB to investigate optimization procedures for
hypersphere packing in non-Euclidean N-dimensional
hyperbolic space.While these examples both draw on the same concept
of space (“extent of an object”), the notion of spatial
thinking provided by the National Research Council
(2006) highlights that the contexts of use and forms of
representation used by an engineer and a mathematician
as well as the rationale propelling their lines of work dif-
fer in important ways. Because the spatial thinking con-
struct brings a focus to the use of space during problem
solving, it readily subsumes many traditional concep-
tions of visuospatial ability, but it also meaningfully ex-
tends the analysis of problem solving to consider the
representational contexts of use (e.g., diagrams, maps,
computer visualizations) as well as the processes of rea-
soning (e.g., drawing on concepts of space to structure a
problem solution and construct inferences about a pos-
sible solution strategy). The power of the spatial thinking
construct rests precisely in its ability to focus attention
on shared aspects of spatial thought across STEM while
also highlighting that these shared practices instantiate
differently depending on the disciplinary context. There
is no short list of concepts that are expressed in a
language of space: biologists use space to explain the
structure–function relationships in biological systems,
chemists use space to explain how molecules are struc-
tured and interact during a reaction, civil engineers use
space to design skyscrapers and test the impacts of wind
shear. Each discipline reasons about space, but employs
different ways of expressing space via representations
and tools, and employs specific ways of framing discip-
linary problems and scientific inquiry.
Reframing spatial thinking in this way will not only be
generative toward conceiving new learning environments
that exist outside the historically narrow notions of how
to improve STEM achievement, it also has the potential
to address misconceptions around who can succeed in
science. This characterization of spatial thinking does
not mandate a singular approach to curriculum reform:
rather, it suggests that diverse learning environments
can address spatial thinking in a discipline in substan-
tially different ways. This flexibility provides ample
creative space for researchers and practitioners to
consider ways to increase students’ “STEM dose”
early on and potentially increase the likelihood that
they pursue STEM careers in their professional lives
(cf. Wai, Lubinski, Benbow, & Steiger, 2010). More
crucially, conceiving of spatial thinking as a flexible
framework with no singular application affords signifi-
cant intellectual diversity: research questions can
move away from framing learning in deficit, as in the
case of training spatial ability. This is particularly
consequential when considering that the targets of
these deficit models often and disproportionately are
women and historically underrepresented minorities
(Newcombe & Stieff, 2012).
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improved by designing learning environments that have
students use their bodies to represent and enact spatial
concepts vis-à-vis discipline-specific representations and
processes of reasoning. From infancy, humans interact
with the world through multiple senses. Babies use their
hands and feet to push on their surroundings and re-
ceive direct perceptual feedback from their eyes, ears,
and sense of touch about the consequences of their ac-
tions. The closely coupled feedback between actions and
perception shapes the way in which humans begin to
form internal representations of their world (Wellsby &
Pexman, 2014). In fact, before an infant is even able to
talk, it develops a basic sense of physical cause and ef-
fect: if a block has been pushed off a ledge, infants are
puzzled if the block does not then immediately fall. This
process of generating mental representations with our
bodies extends well beyond infancy. When children rea-
son about the concept of number and the operations of
addition and subtraction, they often use their fingers to
represent these abstract ideas. Furthermore, research in
the field of gesture for learning supports the idea that
having students use their hands and bodies while learn-
ing complex concepts improves their memory and rea-
soning about those concepts. For example, students
taught via gesture about the concept of the slope of a
line better understand the ideas of “increasing and
decreasing” trends (Alibali et al., 2013). The process by
which physical action in the world generates, stores, and
reactivates mental representations abstracted from
bodily experience is what is often referred to as
embodiment.
Embodied cognition and spatial thinking
Although there is as yet no unified theory of
embodiment, scholars of embodied cognition
generally agree that mental processes are mediated
by body-based systems, including body shape,
movement, and scale; motor systems, including
the neural systems engaged in action planning; and
the systems involved in sensation and perception
(Alibali & Nathan, 2012, p. 248).The embodied mind
Theories of embodied cognition propose to explain the
genesis of human conceptual knowledge representation
and cognitive processing as rooted to varying degrees in
the shape of the human body and its action with the
environment. The pursuit to unify various aspects of
cognition with respect to bodily form and action, how-
ever, has given rise to various interpretations of the
“embodiment” construct and the degree to whichbehavior and knowledge representation can be viewed as
body-based. Given the polysemous nature of embodied
cognition and an incomplete theoretical parsimony in
the literature, we first clarify what precisely we mean by
embodiment, the evidence taken to support this account,
and what implications should arise from this theoretical
framing.
Although theories of embodied cognition have been
around for decades, there is no singular view of what is
meant by the term “embodiment” or embodied action
(Anderson, 2003). In a broad sense, embodiment is char-
acterized by a shared assumption that the body, its par-
ticular form, and its sensory capacities supply a cognitive
system with a rich input stream that shapes knowledge
representation and later cognitive processing of those
representations. However, despite this class of shared
assumptions, researchers operationalize “the embodied
mind” differently in empirical work and it is not always
clear that embodiment is an umbrella term for lines of
work separated by differing philosophical assumptions.
Wilson (2002) has provided a succinct review of these
threads, their assumptions, and the claims they have
advanced. Embodiment, as referenced in this article, is
consistent with Wilson’s sixth claim: namely, that offline
cognition is body-based. Embodiment in this sense is a
fundamentally brain-based phenomenon, where, “[the]
function of the sensorimotor resources is to run a simu-
lation of some aspect of the physical world, as a means
of representing information or drawing inferences”
(Wilson, 2002, p. 633).
Some important existence proofs of embodiment have
arisen out of studies of semantics, suggesting that mean-
ing and knowledge representation engage sensorimotor
simulation. Humans are quicker to identify whether a
common household tool (e.g., frying pan, hammer) is in
the correct or inverted orientation when the stimulus is
presented in an orientation consistent with how a hu-
man would grasp that object for action (Tucker & Ellis,
1998). In the action-compatibility effect (ACE), Glenberg
and Kaschak (2002) found that participants are quicker
to identify whether a phrase is sensical when participants
move their body in a way congruent with the motion
implied by the sentence. For example, if participants
were asked to press a button that required extension of
the arm away from the body when reading the sentence
“Mary pulled the drawer toward herself,” it would take
longer to judge this sentence as sensical than the condi-
tion where the motion and semantic meaning of the sen-
tence were aligned.
Further behavioral evidence from language processing
studies has shown that comprehension of certain gram-
matical constructions results from a mental simulation
within the action space implied by the sentence. Kaschak
and Glenberg (2000) demonstrated that meaning in
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novative denominal verbs constructed from nouns, par-
ticipants were quicker to read sentences as sensical
when the affordances of the noun were consistent with
the action implied in the sentence. For example, the sen-
tence “the woman crutched the goalie the ball” would be
judged as sensical over the same grammatical construc-
tion “the woman egg-shelled the goalie the ball,” because
a crutch has particular affordances such as rigidity and
extension that allow the woman to transfer the ball to
the goalie that are not possible for the egg shell. Of im-
portance, these effects require no common association
between verb and object. Detectable differences in read-
ing time are also found when participants read sentences
that combine the affordances of objects that exhibit no
typical association, but whose affordances mesh during
mental simulation (e.g., “hang the coat on the vacuum”).
Kaschak and Glenberg argue that a view of language
comprehension as a manipulation and combination of
abstract symbolic knowledge would not predict such
reading time differences. Further, they argue that these
studies lend evidence to support a view that humans
draw on modality-specific information even though they
are displaced in space from the scene, actors, objects,
and syntactic relationships implied by a sentence.
Such behavioral findings are consistent with Wilson’s
(2002) body-based view of offline cognition. A growing
number of neuroimaging studies have also sought to dir-
ectly image the brain regions engaged in these object
recognition and conceptual processing tasks. For ex-
ample, the motor system is shown to selectively activate
when individuals observe objects that have common ac-
tion affordances or read action-related words. Functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have dem-
onstrated that when right-handed participants see im-
ages of tools (e.g., a hammer), higher levels of activation
are observed in the left ventral premotor cortex com-
pared to viewing objects with no typical associated hand
movements (e.g., an elephant), suggesting that percep-
tion of manipulable objects automatically elicits imag-
ined interactions with those objects (Chao & Martin,
2000). When participants read action-related words such
as kick, pick, lick, motor-specific leg, hand, and mouth
areas of the brain activate in response to the word, indi-
cating sensorimotor activation in the comprehension of
these words (Pulvermüller, 2005). Moreover, lesion simu-
lations via transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) have
been shown to induce differences in behavioral perform-
ance with respect to comprehension of such action
words (Pulvermüller, Hauk, Nikulin, & Ilmoniemi, 2005).
These empirical findings provide substance to the
claim that cognition and knowledge representation en-
gage body-based simulation. However, note that we re-
ject the “strong” formulation of the embodimenthypothesis given that it is incongruous with available
neuroscientific evidence (Chatterjee, 2010; Meteyard et
al., 2012). That is, the claim that human knowledge and
cognitive processing are completely embodied and are
composed solely of sensorimotor content is an untenable
position. Recent critiques have emphasized that while
the evidence clearly shows that modal areas of the brain
activate during conceptual processing, it has not been
ruled out that a more abstract form of conceptual know-
ledge does not simply cascade to these areas of the brain
in a functionally unimportant manner (Mahon &
Caramazza, 2008). Meteyard et al. (2012) reviewed a
number of theories of embodiment and claims advanced
about semantic processing in the face of neuroscientific
and neuropsychological literature. The theories of em-
bodiment were graded on a continuum and character-
ized as: (1) non-embodied, (2) secondary embodiment,
(3) weakly embodied, or (4) strongly embodied. At one
end of the continuum, non-embodied theories encom-
pass traditional cognitivist views of representation. At
the other end, strongly embodied theories argue that pri-
mary perceptual cortices are directly recruited in know-
ledge representation and that veridical sensory
impressions are simulated during semantic grounding.
In the middle of the continuum, theories of secondary
and weak embodiment disagree primarily on the extent
to which the modal regions of the brain are directly im-
plicated in knowledge representation. Theories of sec-
ondary embodiment propose “that the semantic system
is independent of but directly associated with sensory
and motor information,” whereas theories of weak em-
bodiment “propose that semantic representations are at
least partly constituted by sensory-motor information”
(Meteyard et al., 2012, pp. 791–2).
Meteyard and colleagues (2012) argued that the
current evidence best aligns with claims from weak em-
bodiment, where functional neural clusters have been
found in regions parallel (e.g., anterior) to primary sen-
sory cortices. Consistent with the functional-anatomical
hypothesis (Chatterjee, 2008), weak embodiment argues
that functional neural clusters that are organized near
primary perceptual cortices, but non-isomorphic to
them, function to abstract features of experience and
provide input into higher-order representational systems.
In a weakly embodied view, abstracted modal experi-
ences converge during the access of mental represen-
tations in convergence zones, where simulation “…
may instead be the activation of feature conjunctions
sufficient to represent a given object, or word”
(Meteyard et al., 2012, pp. 794–5).
Establishing that knowledge is not solely embodied
does not rule out the possibility that all knowledge has
some embodied component. Addressing this possibility
in its full complexity will likely require years of targeted
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dence suggests that cognitive processes that recruit men-
tal imagery appear to have a more strongly embodied
character: “…we find ourselves supporting a position
where primary sensory and motor regions are not acti-
vated during routine semantic processing (in opposition
to strong embodiment) but may be so for deeper pro-
cessing related to imagery” (Meteyard et al., p. 801).
Despite the ongoing debate, the stance advanced by
Chatterjee (2010) that an embodied/disembodied dichot-
omy has “outlived its usefulness” in face of the neurosci-
entific evidence moves the field beyond asking questions
about the existence of embodiment. Instead, nuanced re-
search questions that probe when and to what extent
conceptual knowledge is embodied are likely to be more
generative moving forward. Therefore, embodiment is
better understood through the grounding metaphor: that
particular concepts, and even classes of concepts, are
grounded in perception and action states from an indi-
vidual’s prior experience and that such conceptual know-
ledge is mediated by simulation as a function of task
demands.
Such behavioral and brain imaging studies provide a
strong counterpoint to traditional cognitivist models of
mental representation and computation (e.g., Newell &
Simon, 1972; Pylyshyn, 1984) where amodal symbols
exhibit non-analog mappings to the external world.
Instead, complementing lines of evidence support the
view that important concept-driven processes (e.g., lan-
guage comprehension) can draw on simulation of analog
properties of the body and experience with the external
world to ground meaning. Consistent with the reviewed
literature, grounded views of embodiment do not pos-
ition human perception as a veridical recording system
(Barsalou, 2008; Meteyard et al., 2012). Rather, visual,
auditory, kinesthetic, olfactory, and somatosensory ex-
perience provide a rich input spectrum to the cognitive
system, from which features, relationships, and states are
schematically abstracted — a process that is also subject
to error — that can generalize beyond the immediate
situation in which they were produced (Barsalou, 1999).
As theories of embodiment are translated into ac-
counts of learning, an open question remains about the
mechanism by which new knowledge – especially ab-
stract knowledge – can be accounted for within an em-
bodied framework and how neurally abstracted sensory
impressions are implicated in broader cognitive repre-
sentation. While settling on a specific mechanism is out-
side the scope of this paper, a few possibilities are worth
considering. The first is that embodied actions may pro-
vide students with novel representations for structuring
information and problem solving. In this view, the per-
formance of actions with the body provides learners with
new representations, such as representational gestures,that foreground aspects of a domain in a stable form
that can be readily reproduced. These body-based repre-
sentations might become part of a learner’s “toolbox,”
providing utility for reasoning on novel tasks, where
bodily action might serve to alter the way in which the
learner structures their thinking.
A second possible mechanism is analogy/metaphor.
Analogy and metaphor have long received attention as a
mechanism by which sensorimotor impressions derived
from experience help structure more abstract reasoning
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; for a review see Jamrozik
et al., 2016). In this view, individuals repeatedly access
sensory and motor impressions of concrete objects and
events and come to abstract the more generalizable rela-
tional properties of these instances that apply to other
knowledge. For instance, the phrase “negotiation is a
muscle” could be understood by first accessing sensory
impressions of muscles: muscles are flexible and can
apply force; muscles can be strengthened with practice.
These generalized relationships can then become as-
cribed to “negotiation” in a way that is not made explicit
in the turn of phrase alone. Of importance, fMRI work
has constrained this view: sensorimotor simulation both
varies as a function of the experiential nature of the
source of the metaphor as well as the actual accrued ex-
posure the individual has perceiving and interacting with
the source of that metaphor (Jamrozik et al., 2016). Such
a mechanism is wide-ranging in its explanatory capacity
and resembles other accounts, such as Barsalou’s (1999)
perceptual symbol systems, where “multimodal traces of
neural activity that contain at least some of the motor
information present during actual sensorimotor experi-
ence” (Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010, p. 665) can
ground meaning in simulation.
A third possible mechanism is that performing actions
with the body may serve to sharpen existing spatial rep-
resentations that a learner may already have access to. In
spatial domains, the analogy/metaphor mechanism
brings into question what precisely is the source from
which source-target mapping may proceed. This would
imply that to think spatially may actually involve the re-
activation of an individual’s prior representation of a
spatial concept and make it salient in the new context.
This existing spatial representation, perhaps in the form
of a motor or image schema, can then be mapped to the
novel task in a way that may hone the existing
representation.
This integrative view of mind and body is a departure
point from which to reframe what is at the disposal of a
learner in a learning environment and what potential
consequential utility might result from instruction that
aims to promote embodiment around STEM concepts.
Given the previous assertion that the “strong” form of
embodiment is untenable, it is also not supported by
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during problem solving in STEM tasks merely lack some
embodied alternative. However, there is evidence in ex-
tant literature that human concepts of motion in space
and the representation of spatial relationships is a class
of knowledge that frequently recruits modal simulation
and that the body should thus serve as an inroads to
promoting domain-relevant understanding of spatial
concepts.
On the embodiment of spatial thought
Embodiment is not novel per se in investigations of hu-
man spatial thought and cognition. Developmental psy-
chologists have long explored the connection between
body–environment feedback, concept formations, and
development of mental representations (cf. Wellsby &
Pexman, 2014). Piaget’s observations of his children and
their development of push/pull schema from interacting
with blocks progressively removed from their immediate
reach showed how infants learn about the allowed clas-
ses of interactions with their environments through ac-
tion and perception feedback (Piaget, 1952; Piaget &
Inhelder, 1956). In robotics and artificial intelligence, re-
searchers found that by providing robots with biological
perceptuomotor systems able to perceive, process, and
encode aspects of the external world they could create a
form of intelligence that emerged in the absence of rich
explicit internal representations of the environment
(Brooks, 1991; Kirsh, 1991).
Recently, Waller (2014) argued that “[s]patial thought
may be an excellent venue for [the modal basis of in-
ternal spatial representations], and may be relatively bet-
ter poised than many other research domains to provide
evidence for the constitutive claims of embodied cogni-
tion” (p. 148). Many tasks that are used as proxy mea-
sures for the human capacity to decode and manipulate
spatial entities rely on analog mental simulation. For ex-
ample, Shepard and Metzler’s (1971) canonical finding
of a linear relationship between an individual’s response
time and the angular disparity between two block pairs
in tests of speeded rotation suggests that processes like
mental rotation rely on imagistic manipulation of the
blocks as if they were actually being moved in the
physical world. Moreover, interference studies have
demonstrated that on the block rotations of Shepard
and Metzler, when individuals are asked to rotate a
joystick either aligned or anti-aligned to the required
mental manipulation of the blocks, detectable re-
sponse time differences emerge where the aligned
condition is quicker (Wexler, Kosslyn, & Berthoz,
1998). Chu and Kita (2008, 2011) have shown that in-
dividuals who gesture to solve similar mental rotation
tasks outperform their non-gesturing counterparts
and that this is a trainable skill.If spatial knowledge exhibited a non-analog corres-
pondence to modal experience, then preferred reference
frames in spatial memory tasks should also be an unob-
served phenomenon (Waller, 2014). In tasks probing
judgment of relative distance, participants consistently
prefer to encode the location of objects with respect to
their natural corporeal orientation to gravity. Rather
than observing a chance distribution of a participant’s
reference frame with respect to an array of objects, there
is a strong bias to orient the upward z-axis with the
viewer’s bodily axis. In addition to preferring the vertical
bodily axis, Franklin and Tversky (1990) have also dem-
onstrated that location judgments are not made equally
along all bodily axes. Testing the spatial framework hy-
pothesis, Franklin and Tversky showed that an isotropic
notion of space is undercut by response time biases
where individuals in an upright position were fastest to
identify objects from an imagined array above and below
them, slower to identify objects in front of or behind
them, and slowest to identify the location of objects on a
lateral left–right body axis. Moreover, Kosslyn, Ball, and
Reiser (1978) observed that spatial representations in
memory preserve metric properties. Kosslyn and col-
leagues demonstrated that irrespective of whether a par-
ticipant viewed an actual spatial pictorial representation
or simply imagined one, response times on tasks where
individuals were asked to scan the image were nearly
identical. Taken together, these findings point to an un-
derstanding of space that is modal and analog.
Some of the earliest empirical evidence supporting
embodiment of spatial thought in modern psychology
originated in cognitive linguistics. By investigating the
implicit conceptual structure embedded in human lan-
guage, Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 1999) argued that hu-
man concepts are fundamentally grounded in bodily
experience and arise from experience with the world. In
particular, Lakoff and Johnson provided evidence that
spatial concepts are fundamentally embodied. They cited
cross-linguistic analyses of spatial language to show that
despite millennia of separate evolution, various human
languages contain remarkably similar concepts of space
that map to the anatomy of the human body. In English,
for example, the constructions “the ball is on top of the
box” or “the dog is behind the tree” can be interpreted
from an egocentric reference frame that conceptualizes
spatial relationships structurally isomorphic to the hu-
man body. That is, in the first sentence “top” designates
the point on an object most distal from the pull of grav-
ity. For a human this location corresponds to the head
and, by extension, the same location on the box. In the
second example, the tree acquires the attributes “front”
and “back” because one hemisphere of the tree is in view
(as would be the case in human discourse) while the
other hemisphere is occluded from vision.
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resent and think spatially has also been identified among
expert STEM professionals engaged in their discipline.
Ethnographic studies of scientists engaged in authentic
practice have found that complex spatial ideas are often
conveyed using representational gesture-based and
body-based metaphors. When explaining the complex
configuration of the protein thrombin, research biolo-
gists frequently recruited representational gestures to
demonstrate the complex conformational changes of the
protein in the presence of thrombomodulin with their
hands (Becvar, Hollan, & Hutchins, 2005). In a study of
physicists collaboratively working to understand the re-
lationship between temperature and magnetic transitions
in a particular material, Ochs, Gonzales, and Jacoby
(1996) found that scientists drew on body-based meta-
phors during discourse when they were confused about
novel hypotheses (“When I come down I’m in the do-
main state”). Moreover, Nobel Laureate geneticist
Barbara McClintock has long been recognized for her
innovative approach to imagining herself as the plants
she studied, “perceiving” the chromosomes (Henriksen,
Good, & Mishra, 2015). McClintock’s work lead to a
number of significant breakthroughs in scientific under-
standing of gene expression, exchange of genetic infor-
mation during meiosis, and preservation of information
in telomeres and centromeres.
Neuroimaging studies have only recently begun to
probe how the brain represents spatial information and
the connection between spatial perception, conception,
and language. When individuals view a visual scene and
are then asked to imagine it in the absence of the stimu-
lus, as many as 90% of the voxels that are active during
online perception are also activated during imagined
viewing of the scene (Ganis, Thompson, & Kosslyn,
2004; Kosslyn, Thompson, & Alpert, 1997). Studies of
spatial language have found that the separate grammat-
ical constructions for manner and path found in spoken
language comport with the neural divergence of manner
and path information along ventral and dorsal pathways.
Regions of the laterotemporal cortex associated with ac-
tion perception appear to mediate semantic grounding
of spatial language, where more metaphoric uses of
spatial language are mediated more anteriorly along the
middle temporal gyrus (Chatterjee, 2010). These findings
are broadly consistent with the thesis that humans con-
ceive of space in a manner consistent with the grounded
account of embodiment: mental representation main-
tains analog and metric properties, spatial computation
interfaces with the motor system, humans exhibit a
strong preference to encode spatial relationships consist-
ent with body orientation, highly similar brain regions
activate during perception and imagination of a visual
scene, and spatial language reflects real regionalspecializations for conceiving and perceiving spatial rela-
tionships such as object manner and path. Thus, we
propose that if conceptual knowledge of space is medi-
ated by body-based systems, conceptual knowledge of
space should be groundable through bodily action.
Promoting spatial thinking through embodied actions
National reform efforts have emphasized that fostering
spatial ways of thinking and problem solving are not
broadly represented in contemporary curricula (National
Research Council, 2006). Unlike the long standing his-
tory to reform mathematics and verbal literacy educa-
tion, researchers and educators have paid comparatively
less attention to supporting learners at all levels to mas-
ter knowledge of space, spatial concepts, and the con-
comitant habits of mind that produce critical thinkers in
STEM. The report argues that such a constellation of
skills constitutes a particular form of literacy, subject to
normative forces, where the literate student should be
able to: (1) “have the habit of mind of thinking spatially,”
that is, know the contexts in which it is appropriate to
think spatially, (2) “practice spatial thinking in an in-
formed way,” that is, do so in a principled manner built
on a solid understanding of underlying concepts and
tools of representation, and (3) “adopt a critical stance
to spatial thinking”, that is, critically evaluate sources of
data as well as products of problem solving (National
Research Council, 2006, p. 20).
Of the aspects of spatial literacy that the National Re-
search Council (2006) report highlights, supporting
learners during problem solving to know how to use con-
cepts and representations of space to structure problems
in a domain is most clearly related to traditional learn-
ing outcomes. Teaching students to think spatially, then,
requires considering how embodied actions can promote
and “… [nurture] the practical, emotional, or imagina-
tive states that are thought to undergird formal analyt-
ical thought” (Waller, 2014, p. 147, emphasis added).
Embodied actions, as the name suggests, are related to
embodiment (and in fact, deeply so), but the distinction
between the two is important. We operationalize em-
bodied actions as the purposeful body positions and
movements that an individual engages in during a learn-
ing activity, where these body states and actions exhibit
a non-trivial relationship to the targeted learning object-
ive. In the case of spatial thinking, an embodied action
would represent any purposeful body state or motion
that reproduces a structural mapping to a spatial con-
cept during learning. This distinction between embodi-
ment and embodied action is important because if
embodiment is ultimately a brain-based phenomenon,
then embodied actions represent the physical anteced-
ents of the embodied mind. Moreover, learning environ-
ments can only directly manipulate the physical actions
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around a learning objective.
With this distinction in mind, there is already promis-
ing evidence that embodied actions play an important
role in spatial thinking. Research in gesture for learning
has shown that gesture can influence how learners ap-
proach spatial problems. For example, when students are
given classic gear chaining problems in engineering,
learners taught to physically trace the direction of gears
are more likely to use gesture in their solution strategy
(Alibali, Spencer, Knox, & Kita, 2011). Goldin-Meadow,
Cook, and Mitchell (2009) showed that when students
are taught to group addends with a gesture not explicitly
mentioned in speech, students took up the grouping ges-
ture as part of their explanation. Of importance, these
gestures do not just influence strategy choice, they can
also improve learning outcomes for students over trad-
itional instruction. For example, students who used ges-
tures to represent the grouping of addends in a
mathematical equality were significantly more likely to
mention grouping as a strategy in their verbal explan-
ation and their gesture frequency was associated with
higher scores on an achievement assessment. Similarly,
chemistry students who are taught to use their hands to
represent and maintain complex spatial relationships in
organic molecules outperform their peers when asked to
draw structural diagrams of a molecule from multiple
perspectives (Stieff, Lira, & Scopelitis, 2016).
All of these examples of disciplinary learning show
that gesture, and arguably embodied actions more
broadly, may serve as a useful resource in improving
spatial thinking precisely because it serves to ground un-
derstanding of spatial concepts in bodily action. In fact,
as a manifestation of the embodied mind (Alibali, 2005;
Hostetter & Alibali, 2008), gesture has been argued to
enhance thought by foregrounding action in mental rep-
resentation (Goldin-Meadow & Beilock, 2010). As
argued previously, spatial thought may regularly be
grounded in the simulation of perception and action
states as a means to structure information and draw in-
ferences: mental representations of space maintain ana-
log features of the external world (Kosslyn et al., 1978)
and mental imagistic processes such as mental rotation
interface with the body’s motor system (Chu & Kita,
2008; Waller, 2014; Wexler et al., 1998). Compellingly,
the imagery and computation underlying spatial thinking
can be selectively enhanced through instruction employ-
ing embodied actions. For example, when presented with
the classic “radiation problem” (Gick & Holyoak, 1980)
that involves deciding how to irradiate a tumor without
killing a patient, Craig, Nersessian, and Catrambone
(2002) demonstrated that participants who were asked
to make gestures that described their solution strategy
performed much better than participants who only madea drawing of their solution strategy. Studies such as
these demonstrate that gesture may have a unique role
for supporting spatial thinking that goes beyond drawing
a learner’s attention to spatial information or making
spatial information more salient.
Instructionally supporting broader habits of mind to
think spatially and engage in spatial processes of reason-
ing may also be enhanced by embodied actions.
Gestures, for example, have been shown to play an im-
portant role in learning interactions: they externalize im-
agistic aspects of thought and coordinate shared
attention around representational tools during learning
(Alibali & Nathan, 2012) and speech-gesture discordance
indicates a learner’s receptiveness to instruction (Alibali
& Goldin-Meadow, 1993; Breckinridge-Church &
Goldin-Meadow, 1986). Gestures can also feedback into
and lay the foundation for new knowledge (Goldin-
Meadow et al., 2009). Such research suggests that ges-
ture has clear utility as a visible formative assessment
tool, but that it also serves a broader purpose in individ-
ual cognition. Supporting learners to think spatially
means considering learning environment designs that
provide the imaginative mental states about concepts of
space, tools of representation, and processes of reason-
ing that underlie more formal thought (Waller, 2014).
The reciprocal quality of gesture and other embodied ac-
tions to both externalize thought as well as provide
novel and retrievable resources when learning and prob-
lem solving make it a promising means through which
to promote complex analytical reasoning such as spatial
thinking. The position that embodied actions can act as
resources to improve spatial thinking in STEM is in
sharp contrast to interventionist approaches that aim to
improve spatial thinking in STEM through proxy train-
ing of spatial ability.
Constraining the breadth of embodiment
We have remained largely optimistic about the potential
for embodied actions to improve spatial thinking, but we
wish to constrain this position meaningfully: foremost,
we strongly adhere to the philosophy that learning envi-
ronments should always serve as a testbed where theor-
ies of learning can be placed in harm’s way (Cobb,
Confrey, DiSessa, Lehrer, & Schauble, 2003). This means
that although we are arguing that spatial thinking can be
grounded in body-based simulation, we equally advocate
a healthy skepticism throughout. By testing the viability
of learning environments derived from theory, we can
provide real evidence about whether viewing cognition
as offline body-based simulation grounded in sensori-
motor experience is consequential for supporting stu-
dents across the STEM spectrum. Embodiment is not
new to education research and various scholars have
brought a unique focus to how we understand
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Arguably, multiple lines of investigation are beneficial if
the research field is to achieve any kind of theoretical
parsimony. However, despite the benefits we stand to
gain from studying embodiment as it plays out in situ,
we also argue that our knowledge of how and when em-
bodied actions best support spatial thinking are still
poorly understood and it is necessary to first investigate
these mechanisms through appropriate reductionism (cf.
Núñez, 2012).
We acknowledge that learning often happens through
complex interactions embedded in a sociomaterial envir-
onment. Some work has even specifically sought to
understand embodiment of disciplinary knowledge in
social settings (e.g., Alibali & Nathan, 2012) as well as
advocate distributed embodiment in supporting
students’ understanding of complex systems dynamics
(e.g., Lindgren & Johnson-Glenberg, 2013). While there
is strength in understanding embodiment as it arises in
social contexts, there are a few unavoidable confounds
such an approach encounters when trying to better
understand embodiment as a cognitive phenomenon and
its role in learning. Consider a dyad working together to-
ward understanding the concept of the water cycle. In
the process, these individuals produce a rich exchange of
dialogue as well as various behaviors such as posture
shifts, gestures, and inscriptions to explain how water
moves from reservoirs, into the atmosphere, and then
back down through precipitation. Let us say that one
student is explaining how “water evaporates to become
clouds (hand moves up, palm open).” This student's part-
ner asks a clarifying question about evaporation and per-
forms a similar gesture. Does the second student gesture
because they are simulating evaporation in a way analo-
gous to the first student? Or, on the other hand, does
this gesture now serve as a shared representation to
facilitate communication? While such externalizations
may provide insight into evolving spatial thinking, it is
not clear whether the observed utterances result from
the internal simulations that would have also been
observed from each individual uniquely. Rather it is likely
that the functional role of instances of language, gesture,
and inscription shift fluidly for these learners as they move
between individual reflection, self-explanation, attending
to their interlocutor, and working to construct inferences
in their dyad. Gesture, in particular, which provides insight
into the non-linguistic imagistic aspects of speech, is
highly susceptible to social settings: the threshold above
which someone may gesture is influenced by implicit
mores of the interaction (McNeill, 1992).
Such confounds to studying embodiment as a group
process significantly obfuscate the ability of research to
draw rigorous claims about the extent to which
grounded simulation may support targets such as spatialthinking. This is especially problematic given that recent
critiques from neuroscience indicate that conceptual
grounding may exhibit a developmental arc. Rather than
conceptual grounding being binary, it may actually
evolve along a continuum toward abstract knowledge
representation (Chatterjee, 2010). For example, an indi-
vidual may understand the spatial concept “above” over
the course of multiple exposures to arrays of objects
arranged in an invariant configuration that shapes their
simulation of aboveness. This schematization of the rela-
tionships encoded in “above” no longer pertain to any
specific objects and the concept of “above” becomes
flexible with respect to its referents. Chatterjee refers to
this as referential ambiguity and argues that such
abstraction is fundamental for concepts such as spatial
relationships and configurations. If reasoning about
space depended on first indexing specific objects, it
would hold little utility in novel situations.
In addition to embodiment being subject to a develop-
mental trajectory, spatial thinking is also a complex con-
struct and represents no unified process (National
Research Council, 2006). Spatial thinking subsumes vari-
ous cognitive operations of visualizing and operating on
spatial information, but it also more broadly implicates
the tools and processes of reasoning that situate such
cognitive competencies. We might instead assume that
the role that embodiment plays in supporting learners as
they develop an understanding of concepts of space, the
use of tools to represent data and spatial phenomena,
and the patterns of reasoning in their domain will draw
differentially on simulation. In fact, the demands of
some spatial tasks may more readily activate offline
simulation of perceptual and motor states (e.g., im-
agining an object moving through space, imagining
positioning oneself at different vantage points around
an object) than others (e.g., employing the formalisms
of the Cartesian plane to characterize the velocity of
an object). Given such unanswered questions, there
are likely to be rich contributions to the literature as
well as theory by focusing on embodiment as a cogni-
tive phenomenon at the individual level. The develop-
ment of spatial thinking and the extent to which
domain-relevant spatial concepts and processes of
reasoning can be fostered through embodied action
remain underexplored and warrant investigations in
parallel to efforts that focus on the social nature of
embodiment.
There are also likely to be individual differences with
respect to embodiment that remain underexamined in
extant literature. Perceptual symbols and simulators
(Barsalou, 1999) represent broad theoretical constructs
intended to accommodate all aspects of cognitive repre-
sentation. As such, we should expect variation in the ex-
tent to which conceptual knowledge may reliably
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uals. It is comparatively easier to hypothesize that the
representation of tangible objects such as tools manipu-
lable by hand (e.g., a hammer) should more readily give
rise to similar neural activation across individuals on
networks associated with hand movement and action
planning compared to concrete objects that cannot be
moved by hand (e.g., a building). However, such a priori
specificity of simulation becomes increasingly difficult as
a concept becomes increasingly abstract (e.g., consider
“the basis of freedom” or “world peace”). Such complex-
ity may be attributable to Barsalou’s (1999) argument
that perceptual simulators are simultaneously rational
and empirical. He argues that simulators are rational be-
cause they are rooted in genetic factors. In fact, a vast
majority of humans exhibit a shared anatomy and physi-
ology – bodily and neurally – that privileges particular
classes of data from the world (audition, vision, proprio-
ception, olfaction, etc.) and is also constrained by ana-
tomical factors of the body such as the location of
important sensory organs in the head, the bilateral
symmetry of the body, and the typical preferences of
handedness. Simulators, though, are also empirical be-
cause humans constantly abstract and accrete sensori-
motor impressions from the external world in ways
that reflect idiosyncratic experience. Humans broadly
share a genetic basis for simulation, but the reality
that humans each inhabit a somewhat unique envir-
onment should give rise to variation in the percep-
tions and conceptions of the world that subserve
offline cognition.
Under the notion of variable embodiment (Barsalou,
1999), individual differences should thus arise from idio-
syncrasies that impact either the rational or empirical
basis of simulation. Factors that would affect the rational
basis of simulation arise from atypical anatomies and
physiologies. For example, an individual who lacks input
from some perceptual organ (e.g., deaf, blind), has a con-
genital defect, has had a lesion or stroke, or is born with
atypical anatomy (e.g., missing a limb) has a significantly
altered rational input into the cognitive system and this
should give rise to unique embodiment. Within popula-
tions that do not have physiological disparities, differen-
tial embodiment should thus arise from the unique
empirical experiences underlying simulation. Differences
in experience occur constantly, given that no two
humans inhabit the same corner of an ecological niche.
In an fMRI study, ballet and capoeira dancers were both
shown videos of their particular dance style as well as
the style they had not had experience performing.
Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, and Haggard
(2005) found that even though both groups of dancers
had extensive experience engaging in their respective
forms of dance, brain areas associated with actioncontrol activated more when dancers viewed a video
depicting the form of dance they had personally per-
formed. This effect was found even within a particular
style of dance when male ballet dancers watched video
of moves only performed by their female counterparts
(Calvo-Merino, Grèzes, Glaser, Passingham, & Haggard,
2006). Thus, representation and simulation differ meas-
urably as a function of direct experience and direct ex-
perience observing action differs from performing the
action physically. In the case of the dancers, the specifi-
city of motor movement mattered and the findings
suggested that “[h]aving produced an action affected
the ways the dancers perceived the action, suggesting
that the systems involved in action production sub-
serve action perception” (Goldin-Meadow & Beilock,
2010, p. 666).
Design of learning environments for spatial
thinking
The lines of evidence discussed above demonstrate that
individuals can make use of embodied actions when en-
gaged in spatial thinking and, importantly, that such ac-
tions can be trained to yield improvements in both
spatial learning in a discipline (e.g., Goldin-Meadow
et al., 2009; Stieff et al., 2016) and spatial abilities such
as mental rotation (e.g., Chu & Kita, 2008, 2011). Of im-
portance, these prior studies have demonstrated the ef-
fectiveness of embodied actions, specifically gestures,
whether they are spontaneously produced by the learner
or externally directed by someone else. These varied
roles for embodied actions in spatial thinking suggest
that new learning environments that wish to improve
spatial learning in general or in the content of a STEM
discipline should integrate embodied actions as a pri-
mary target of intervention. A common feature of em-
bodied actions is that they are purposeful and
intentional; all movement is not good movement. Em-
bodied learning environments must aim to help
learners make explicit connections between the form
of a gesture or a specific action and the spatial infor-
mation that is represented by the body or the action.
While gestures are easily used in this way to comple-
ment verbal communication (McNeill, 1992), linking
them to spatial concepts, forms of representation, or
processes of reasoning that are unfamiliar or highly
abstracted from everyday experience is nontrivial. As
such, we propose here a set of preliminary design
principles motivated by the research on embodied
action that we hope will help designers develop new
interventions that not only improve spatial thinking
and student learning outcomes but also provide a
novel context for continued study on the nature of
spatial thinking and the affordances of embodied
action for learning.
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should include scaffolds that explicitly map spatial
entities and their relationships to the hands or the body
Studies that have demonstrated the efficacy of embodied
actions, specifically gestures, for promoting learning in
different contexts share common features with respect
to the embodied actions employed by teachers and
learners. Namely, the gestures observed in these diverse
studies have all been explicitly linked to discrete entities
in the problem space. For example, learners have been
seen to benefit from gestures that represent the combin-
ation of addends to predict a sum (Goldin-Meadow
et al., 2009) or gestures that represent imperceptible
phenomena such as proteins (Becvar et al., 2005). The
efficacious use of gesture in this way suggests that new
learning environments should help learners make clear
and immediate connections between embodied actions
and spatial entities to best support spatial learning. Such
scaffolds must not only ensure that the embodied action is
congruent with the concept to be learned (see Lindgren &
Johnson-Glenberg, 2013), they must also ensure the
learner can perceive the relevant congruency. For
example, a gesture that represents the distance between
two points on a surface or the three-dimensional structure
of a molecule may promote learning about important
spatial relationships in a STEM discipline, but only to the
extent that the learner perceives the relationship between
the gesture and the represented phenomenon. To perform
the gesture without knowledge of its relevance to a learn-
ing objective is unlikely to benefit learning.
Although the design principle seems obvious, it is not
the case that these relationships are immediately evident
to the learner without careful scaffolding in the learning
environment. In fact, several empirical studies suggest
that without explicit scaffolds on the relevance of ges-
ture for supporting learning the benefits of gesture are
easily missed. For example, Howison et al. (2011) dem-
onstrated that young learners can use gesture to
improve their understanding of proportionality, but this
occurs through a gradual process that requires direct
feedback on the quality of certain gestures for represent-
ing a specific ratio. More compelling, Walkington et al.
(2014) showed that adult mathematics learners also
benefit from using trained gestures while learning about
proofs; however, these benefits were only observed when
accompanied by additional instructional scaffolds that
explained to the learner how the gestures were related
to underlying mathematical concepts. The critical role of
instructional scaffolds that explain the relevance of ges-
tures has also been seen in the domain of chemistry.
Stieff et al. (2016) demonstrated that learners can benefit
from performing gestures while learning about molecu-
lar structures only in cases where the instructor provides
explicit guidance about how the hands can be configuredto represent spatial relationships depicted in chemis-
try diagrams; when this guidance was absent, they
observed no benefit of gestures even when partici-
pants performed them.
Design principle #2: Embodied learning environments
should leverage motoric actions to simulate high-fidelity
spatial operations that would otherwise be imagined by
the learner
Beyond representing spatial relationships within and
between unseen phenomena, extant research strongly
suggests that embodied actions can help learners better
apprehend spatial transformations of those objects. Such
transformations are varied and include predicting the
outcome of a rotation or reflection as well as more com-
plex dynamic spatiotemporal operations, such as the
multiple transformations involved in simulating move-
ment in a pulley system or gear train. In Chu and Kita’s
(2008) work on gesture for promoting mental rotation,
the researchers observed the highest performing partici-
pants to rotate their hands in a manner that suggested
the participants were simulating the possible rotations of
the stimuli with their hands. The use of embodied ac-
tions in this way has also been observed in the context
of STEM learning. Kozhevnikov, Motes, & Hegarty
(2007) showed that embodied actions are performed by
STEM learners simulating kinematics in the domain of
physics, while Stieff and colleagues showed that chemis-
try learners use their hands to simulate different mo-
lecular conformations that result from the internal
rotation of atoms around bonds (Stieff et al., 2016) or
the coupling of molecules in a reaction (Stieff, 2011).
The physiological limitations of human anatomy pre-
clude using embodied actions to simulate all the various
spatial operations learners are tasked with understanding
in the context of STEM classrooms, but many spatial
concepts can be mapped to embodied actions with high
fidelity (Johnson-Glenberg, Birchfield, Tolentino, &
Koziupa, 2014). For example, gestures can easily simu-
late different types of motion around geologic faults
(Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben, 2008) or the movement of
astronomical bodies in planetary systems (Padalkar &
Ramadas, 2011). In fact, notoriously difficult abstract
spatial concepts, such as quaternions in mathematics,
torque in physics, or magnetic anisotropy in chemistry
can readily be represented by embodied actions that
involve moving only the hands and arms. We argue
actions such as these should be the prime target for
designers who wish to incorporate embodied action into
STEM learning environments. High-fidelity actions
present the dual benefit of permitting the learner to per-
form an action that would otherwise be simulated men-
tally and increasing the salience of the relationship
between the embodied action and the spatial entities
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produce gesture or other actions that have a low degree
of physical fidelity may present more challenges to the
learner than possible benefits, as has been seen with
learning environments that include low-fidelity visualiza-
tions in science classrooms (Collins, 1996). In the short
term, embodied actions may serve as reinforcing repre-
sentations (e.g., representational gestures) that can be
reproduced as needed during problem solving. Then,
with accrued experience of an embodied action, the need
to overtly perform these actions should diminish as ab-
stracted perception and action states become integrated
into a learner’s mental representation.
Design principle #3: Embodied learning environments
should link innovative tools, such as visualizations or
other simulations, to embodied actions through interface
elements and input devices
As previously argued, the benefits of embodied action
may result from the cueing of motor schemas or analog
spatial representations during activity that are then
linked to spatial concepts or disciplinary representations
during learning. Given the increasing ubiquity of novel
visualization technologies for supporting spatial learning
in STEM disciplines and demonstrations of their effi-
cacy, we argue that these technologies should work to
link embodied actions with digital visualizations through
input devices. We note that “gestural interfaces” that are
designed to permit users to navigate through an inter-
face without the use of a mouse or keyboard do not
make use of the affordances of embodied action for
learning as we have outlined here: opening browsers by
tapping or swiping a screen to scroll through media do
not recruit motor actions with any fidelity to spatial op-
erations or link representational gestures to spatial en-
tities. As such, designs such as these are not likely to
support spatial learning. In contrast, designs that allow
users to manipulate virtual objects as if they were tan-
gible, present an interesting opportunity to support
spatial learning by permitting users to perform em-
bodied actions on visualizations of imperceptible or diffi-
cult to perceive phenomena. Leveraging both the
embodied action and the visualization in tandem may
yield far greater benefits than have been observed from
either intervention alone.
In fact, preliminary models for coupling these tech-
nologies, and the resultant benefits, are already emer-
ging. Barrett, Stull, Hsu, and Hegarty (2015) designed an
application that allowed users to manipulate a virtual
molecular model using a haptic input device. The device,
a small plastic ovoid with embedded accelerometers, was
linked to the application programming interface (API) in
such a way that when handled it offered users the sense
of physically interacting with the virtual model tointerrogate spatial relationships between atoms and to
observe the effects of rotating or twisting bonds on mo-
lecular configuration. In a series of studies, the authors
documented that the technology was as effective as or
better than handling physical models for helping users
learn about stereochemistry and representational com-
petence in chemistry. Moreover, the flexibility of the
software environment offers new opportunities to scaf-
fold spatial learning through constraining the degrees of
freedom in a typical spatial operation so that it is easier
to perceive the outcome of a transformation or by pro-
viding feedback on the outcome of a simulated action.
Such work has been explored by Palmerius, Höst, &
Schönborn (2012); they showed that gesture-based input
devices that employ force touch sensors coupled to visu-
alizations of biomolecules can help users easily learn
how electrostatic interactions contribute to enzyme-
substrate kinetics and molecular docking and recogni-
tion events.
Many concepts that require spatial thinking in STEM
may readily be taught through the use of visualization
technologies that leverage innovative input devices.
Some of these entities we have addressed are too small
to directly perceive (e.g., molecules), but there are other
theoretical and conceptual entities in STEM that lack
direct perceptual components on their own. Such con-
cepts are also frequently invoked to reason about behav-
iors of physical systems (e.g., force in Newtonian
mechanics, wave functions in quantum mechanics).
Despite the inherent lack of perceptual features, it is
common for scientists to construct external representa-
tions of these concepts (e.g., force vectors, mathematical
models of electron density). These external representa-
tions then serve as tools with which to reason about in-
herently non-perceptual phenomena. Visualization,
arguably, serves as one type of tool with which novel
representations of complex concepts in STEM can be
presented and coupled to embodied actions. It may be
that the lack of regular perceptual access to various
STEM phenomena is part of what makes them so chal-
lenging to learn. We would hypothesize that concepts
that require spatial thinking, but lack direct perceptual
character, may most effectively be taught via
visualization technology aligned to embodied actions
and yield greater gains for learners compared against
traditional instruction.
Toward applying embodied design principles:
A pilot study
In our current research, we have attempted to explore
the utility of these design principles for development
and for research with an embodied interface that helps
learners to apprehend spatial concepts and tools of rep-
resentation in the discipline of organic chemistry. The
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environment that merges perceptually rich, responsive
computer technologies with scaffolded learning activities
to teach students to apprehend and produce disciplinary
diagrams that represent molecular structure. The tech-
nology (first reported in DeSutter & Stieff, 2014) belongs
to a class of molecular visualization interfaces (e.g., Jmol,
PyMOL, Avogadro) that use molecular structure data
files to depict complex molecules as a visual representa-
tion of atoms (spheres) connected via single, double, or
triple bonds (cylinders). Molecular visualization pro-
grams broadly speaking allow users to control the pres-
entation of a molecule in virtual three-dimensional
space via mouse movements. This software, though, dif-
fers from existing molecular visualizations by natively
implementing computer vision algorithms that allow the
learner to instead control the view of the visualization
by physically changing their perspective relative to the
screen. The face-tracking algorithm captures a student’s
location relative to the computer screen and then
dynamically updates the three-dimensional virtual scene
as if these body movements actually occurred in the vir-
tual environment. By leaning to the left or the right, the
virtual scene shifts to show what would be seen if one
could take the same vantage point on the rendered mol-
ecule in actual three-dimensional space. A depiction of
how leaning from side to side controls the view of the
interface can be seen in Fig. 1.
The embodied interface was designed with modularity
in mind: it is intended to be used flexibly in learning en-
vironments that may differ in their learning objectives,
but share a core commitment to investigating the role of
embodiment in spatial thinking. In a recent pilot study,
we tailored the design to investigate whether an em-
bodied interface instantiating the aforementioned design
principles could support students in understanding the
complex spatial relationships in structural diagrams in
organic chemistry. In the chemistry curriculum, students
often struggle to interpret, relate, and transformFig. 1 By shifting perspective from left to right, the molecular visualization
assumed perspectiverepresentations as they reason about imperceptible phe-
nomena (Kozma & Russell, 1997). Structural diagrams
are a widely used communicating and reasoning tool in
chemistry, as well as other STEM disciplines. Structural
diagrams in organic chemistry are used to encode the
spatial relationships of a molecule when it is viewed
from particular angles. Two common diagrams that stu-
dents are introduced to in their first semester are the
Dash-Wedge and Newman projection diagrams (see
Fig. 2). These diagrams can be understood as viewing a
molecular structure from either a “side-on” (Dash-
Wedge) or an “end-on” (Newman) perspective. Each
diagram then deploys its own semiotic conventions to
encode atomic identity, perspective in space, and relative
spatial placement of atomic groups. Of importance, the
same molecule can be viewed from multiple perspectives
and multiple Dash-Wedge and Newman diagrams can
be drawn to represent it. Figure 2 depicts how the mol-
ecule (1R,2R)-1-aminopropane-1,2-diol can be encoded
in Dash-Wedge and Newman structural formalisms
from multiple viewing perspectives. Note that a Newman
diagram and a Dash-Wedge diagram of the same struc-
ture can be related to one another through the spatial
transformation of a perspective shift.
To investigate how this embodied interface supported
students as they interpreted and related structural dia-
grams, we recruited naïve students (n = 6) to use the
interface to explore how structural diagrams represent
molecular structure and the spatial transformations that
exist between them. The embodied interface was aug-
mented to couple the face-tracking technology with
changes in the visualization window. The interface was
programmed to respond as a learner aligned their
perspective to the vantage point encoded in either a
Dash-Wedge or Newman diagram: the interface would
swap out the three-dimensional ball and stick model
with the correct structural diagram. Students were first
taught to relate their movements to the different per-
spectives and representations through explicit scaffoldsinterface changes to reorient the molecule with the learner’s
Fig. 2 Equivalent structural diagrams of (1R,2R)-1-aminopropane-1,2-diol. A circle has been added beneath the structure of the molecule to show
which vantage points coincide with the Newman (top left, top right) and Dash-Wedge (bottom left, bottom right) diagrams. Atoms are color coded
to correspond to their identity: gray = carbon (C), white = hydrogen (H), red = oxygen (O), blue = nitrogen (N)
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signed that prompted students to use the interface to in-
vestigate three unique molecules and to draw at least
one Dash-Wedge and one Newman diagram of each
molecule on a provided piece of paper. An example of
how the interface produced structural diagrams in re-
sponse to physical perspective shifts is presented in
Fig. 3.
Each participant was first guided to manipulate one
molecule through specific perspectives and representa-
tions before freely exploring how structural diagrams
could be drawn from the remaining two molecules.
Participants were asked to perform discrete tasks and
think aloud as they used the interface. For example, they
were asked to explain how the virtual three-dimensional
scene changed as they physically shifted their perspec-
tive, they were asked to demonstrate what vantageFig. 3 Structural diagrams (here the Newman diagram) are rendered as the
diagram down on paperpoints coincided with each structural diagram, and they
were prompted to explain how the physical movements
they performed triggered different structural diagrams of
the molecule to appear on screen. Moreover, when stu-
dents reached the first example of a Dash-Wedge or
Newman diagram, they were asked to explain how the
spatial relationships in the structural diagram corre-
sponded to the three-dimensional ball and stick render-
ing and then were directed to sketch the corresponding
structural diagram on paper. The inclusion of scaffolding
supports for students was critical given prior findings
that the usefulness of any learning environment design
can be undercut by not adequately considering the sup-
ports that students need to orient themselves properly
to the learning activity.
A crucial feature of this design is the use of computer
vision (OpenCV) to extend interaction beyond theparticipant aligns their perspective correctly. Students then copy this
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sequence are expected to know that a Newman diagram
and a Dash-Wedge diagram of the same structure are re-
lated through a perspective shift. The face-tracking tech-
nology at the center of this embodied interface was
embedded into the design so that learners could pro-
gress from having a notional idea of the spatial operation
of changing perspective to having direct experience of
moving between multiple structural diagrams. This
design feature directly establishes a correspondence
between the spatial operation of perspective shift and a
high-fidelity motoric action (Design principle #2). From
the theory of embodiment and proposed relationship to
spatial thought, learners may struggle to mentally
imagine shifting their perspective around a three-
dimensional molecule in order to create structural
diagrams without adequate prior perceptuomotor states
to simulate. The embodied interface, thus, grounds per-
spective shifts in a tangible corporeal action that is at
the disposal of the student.
Following completion of the learning activity, partici-
pants were asked to draw a Dash-Wedge and a Newman
diagram of a statically rendered molecule without the
aid of the software interface. Of interest, we observed
that some students continued to physically shift their
perspective as they had done when using the interface.
This occurred specifically when the participants
attempted to draw the Newman projection, which re-
quired imagining a vantage point different from the per-
spective encoded in the image. Figure 4 shows a student
drawing a Newman projection from a static image of
(1S,2S)-1-amino-2-chloropropan-1-ol. Given that the
image she sees is static, there should be no clear affor-
dance of physically changing perspective. Such behavior
suggests that instructing individuals with a high-fidelity
embodied action influenced their immediate problem-
solving strategy choice beyond the context of the em-
bodied interface.
The visualization interface presented here uses only
one of many forms of human–computer interaction thatFig. 4 Students shifting their physical perspective as they work to draw a N
static image. Correctly drawing the Newman diagram requires students to
embodied interface, students reproduced the high-fidelity motoric action ecan link motoric action to the control of a molecular
visualization interface for spatial thinking. Novel tools
and technologies for improving spatial thinking should
consider that the link between motoric action and tech-
nology interfaces has expanded profoundly since the in-
vention of the mouse (Design principle #3). Various
input devices are at the disposal of designers and have
the potential to contribute to research around embodied
actions for spatial thinking. In the case of our research,
we wanted to know whether linking a motoric action
that directly comports with how humans experience
their environment might be useful in teaching about
spatial perspective shifts. Other projects may have differ-
ent research aims and we chose to leverage existing
computer hardware enhanced by computer vision. Each
learning environment embedding embodied actions to
improve spatial thinking must ultimately justify the in-
clusion of any particular novel technology. These tech-
nologies must be justified in terms of their affordance
for high-fidelity motoric action and how such action
should improve knowledge of spatial concepts under-
lying disciplinary representation and processes of rea-
soning in the chosen STEM domain. The choices for
designers are uncountable and span from enhancing
traditional computer hardware with computer vision
libraries, to novel input sensors like the LEAP motion
controller that allows gestural control, to those that do
not even require a traditional computer such as
smartphone-driven virtual reality headsets.
Of importance, new investigations regarding embodied
interfaces and spatial thinking in STEM must not only
examine the efficacy of such interfaces for improving
learning in real world contexts, they must also strive to
reveal the precise causal mechanisms by which these in-
terfaces support and improve spatial thinking. The inter-
face we described here was built around all three design
principles we enumerated to yield a design that could
best support spatial thinking in chemistry in a prelimin-
ary investigation. Future investigations will need to com-
pare the relative benefits of embodied actions that varyewman perspective of (1S,2S)-1-amino-2-chloropropan-1-ol from a
mentally imagine shifting their perspective. After learning from the
ven though it no longer controlled the visual display
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extent to which those actions are analogous to imag-
ined spatial operations and their integration with high
quality visualizations. As above, the affordances of
embodied actions for spatial thinking may result from
their role as external representations that make spatial
information more salient or their ability to cue rele-
vant spatial motor schemas that help learners predict
the outcome of a dynamic transformation. It remains
unclear whether one or both of these mechanisms
best explain the efficacy of embodied actions for pro-
moting STEM learning, and alternative interfaces that
make spatial information, both static and dynamic,
more salient will need to be pitted against embodied
interfaces such as we have described here.
Conclusions
Training the next generation of STEM professionals
will require a broad effort at all levels of reform to
address the issues facing the modern student and de-
signing new curricula and technology to support
spatial thinking represent crucial targets in this effort
(National Research Council, 2006). Various learning
environments have emerged that aim to improve
spatial thinking in STEM; however, despite some lim-
ited success, differing assumptions have been made
about the nature of spatial thinking and the causal
means to improve it. Rather than targeting domain-
general competencies such as visuospatial ability,
spatial thinking may need to be addressed within its
disciplinary context of use, giving attention to the
spatial concepts that underlie disciplinary concepts,
how spatial concepts are instantiated in representa-
tional tools of that domain, and the spatial ways of
thinking that contextualize the use of spatial concepts
and representation in service of scientific inquiry.
Embodied actions as we have argued may directly
meet the needs of improving spatial thinking, given
evidence that aspects of human knowledge and espe-
cially spatial knowledge and computation are
grounded in perception and action simulation. Of
importance, evidence suggests that embodied actions
can influence spatial thinking by providing a body-
based representation that foregrounds action in
mental representation. Learning environments that
merge embodied actions with representationally rich,
domain-relevant visual displays, in particular, may
serve to broadly improve real outcomes for STEM
students.
An epistemic hurdle remains, though, for the research
field. If the embodied/disembodied dichotomy has truly
outlived its usefulness, then we are dealing with an ex-
pansive gray area where some aspects of knowledge and
cognition are grounded in simulation, whereas othersare not. What should be foregrounded in studies of
embodiment is what we will accept as evidence of
embodiment and, for those invested in learning, what
serves as acceptable evidence that instruction via em-
bodied action leads to a student embodying a concept
that they had not embodied before. A number of studies
have used an interference paradigm to argue for the ex-
istence of perceptuomotor simulation based on response
time biases. These studies suggest that if a participant
can be posed a task that requires simulation as part of
semantic grounding, then asking them to move their
bodies in ways contrary to what should be required of
conceptual processing should give rise to detectable
response time differences. For example, in the ACE,
Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) empirically demonstrated
that individuals comprehend action sentences slower
when the motion the participant performs to press a
button on a response box falls incongruent with the mo-
tion implied by the sentence. In fact, there is little doubt
that these empirical findings are robust, as they have
been replicated across multiple experimental contexts
multiple times (Kaschak, Jones, Coyle, & Sell, 2009; cited
in Chatterjee, 2010). However, “[what] does it mean to
have quicker responses on the order of 10 to 100 milli-
seconds?” (Chatterjee, 2010, p. 85). It is not that some-
one’s thinking grinds to a halt when they are prevented
from moving their hands or their physical action is mis-
matched to the one they are imagining during concep-
tual processing. Response time disparities are in fact
predicted by theories of embodiment, but these metrics
on their own cannot definitively explain when or why
perceptual and motor systems are engaged during con-
ceptual processing.
The notion that conceptual processing is accompanied
by perceptual and motor activation is relatively uncon-
troversial. In fact, many neuroimaging studies have em-
pirically demonstrated that the automatic observation of
manipulable objects, comprehension of sentences that
imply bodily action, and the observations of another’s
actions all lead to clear demonstrable activation of the
motor system (Mahon & Caramazza, 2008). Moreover,
imagining an image activates 90% of the same neural
substrates active during actual perception (Ganis et al.,
2004; Kosslyn et al., 1997). What remain contested are
the top-down models of conceptual processing that em-
bodiment builds on. Whether perceptual and motor acti-
vation grounds concepts in the mind or is just an
epiphenomenon of a more abstract conceptual know-
ledge cascading through these brain regions is not a set-
tled matter. If the field is to continue arguing for the
view that concepts are grounded in perception and ac-
tion and that this manifests, quite literally, in the brain,
then a mutually supporting collaboration must be estab-
lished with neuroscientists to assure that our working
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undermined.
An open collaboration between educational and
neuroscience research should prove to be mutually
beneficial on this front. Neuroscientists are already
posing questions about the nature of knowledge repre-
sentation, memory, and cognitive processing and a num-
ber of these researchers agree that the evidence suggests
a selectively embodied cognitive architecture (e.g.,
Chatterjee, 2010; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Meteyard et
al., 2012). As natural scientists use instrumentation in
the laboratory to hone their understanding and theory of
physical systems, we should not rule out that the thesis
of the embodied mind could also be honed from direct
brain imaging studies. If educational researchers are to
continue claiming that knowledge is embodied, then
neuroscience provides direct empirical evidence of what
is embodied and when. Learning environments can then
scrutinize these models by deriving testable conjectures
and embedding them in learning environments that
explicitly put to the test how people learn. Such work is
worthwhile because it also satisfies the need to provide
feedback mechanisms for neuroscientists to examine
how their top-down models of cognition fare in eco-
logically situated contexts.
Concepts are also a complex entity when we consider
them at the level of classroom-based learning. It is not
sufficient to claim that a disciplinary concept is em-
bodied without some specificity around what we mean
by concept, what that concept is composed of, and what
precisely is being (or should be) embodied as an out-
come of learning. One possibility may be to draw on
framings in the literature around conceptual knowledge
and its phenomenological basis (Smith, diSessa, &
Roschelle, 1994; diSessa, 1988). This work argues that
concepts are not stable monolithic entities, but rather
are dynamic loose networks of interconnected know-
ledge elements that can rearrange in response to context
and are composed of explanatory primitives (some that
have a clear somatic basis) that can bear little resem-
blance to expert causal thinking. As we consider learn-
ing through embodied actions and what embodiment of
conceptual knowledge looks like as an outcome of learn-
ing, we are likely to find a similar rich diversity beneath
the surface. For example, rather than claiming that a stu-
dent embodies the concept of “the water cycle,” maybe
instead there are discrete composite features of a model
conception of the water cycle that are grounded in simu-
lation (e.g., the movement of water between reservoir
and atmosphere, condensation, and evaporation) and
others that are not (e.g., transfer of solar energy to kin-
etic energy).
While the research field settles on the evidentiary basis
of claims of embodiment, arguably the best source ofevidence at our disposal may be in both observing the
visible manifestations of embodiment as well as experi-
mentally manipulating the availability of embodied
actions in an intervention. Gestures, as one well-studied
example, have been argued to arise from simulations of
motor action in the brain cascading to trigger the execu-
tion of visible motor programs, making it an observable
manifestation of embodiment (Hostetter & Alibali,
2008). Cognitive processing and knowledge that evoke a
strong perceptuomotor character should correlate to
increased frequency of gesture use. In fact, it is a well-
documented phenomenon that humans often gesture
when talking about space (Alibali, 2005). This may ren-
der gesture as a useful proxy for detecting a learner’s
underlying simulation and has potential to provide in
situ evidence that embodiment is implicated in a
student’s explanation or solution strategy.
Directly manipulating the availability of gesture may
provide further evidence of embodiment. In the context
of investigating the embodiment of spatial thought,
manipulating the availability of gesture/embodied action
on tasks that explicitly involve spatial reasoning should
give rise to differences in group level and within-subject
performance. The work of Chu and Kita (2011) stands
out as an example of this methodology: the authors first
manipulated between subjects whether participants were
encouraged to gesture on a Shepard and Metzler-style
block rotation task. They then gave a second assessment
where they manipulated within-subject gesture availabil-
ity. They found that individuals who were encouraged to
gesture in the first task outperformed their peers on the
second task, demonstrating that there was some durable
effect of using their hands to reason about the complex
spatial transformation beyond the immediate gestural
act. Similar to a manipulation check, by altering the
availability of embodied actions we can selectively ob-
serve, all other things being equal (ceteris paribus),
whether embodied actions positively impact perform-
ance on the task at hand. Manipulating the availability of
embodied actions provides a way to observe the connec-
tion between embodied actions and embodiment (i.e.,
offline simulation), especially when those taught to use
their body on a task still outperform a control group in
the absence of overt movement.
A decade on, the National Research Council’s (2006)
call to action still resonates. Improving spatial thinking
in STEM will require many learning environments, in
many disciplines, over many iterations. Embodied ac-
tions, because they have the potential to ground abstract
concepts of space and their forms in representation and
reasoning in tangible body-based ways, may rather ef-
fectively allow learning environment designers to achieve
their desired learning objectives. Our optimism is quali-
fied by the need for a continued examination of the
DeSutter and Stieff Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications  (2017) 2:22 Page 19 of 20assumptions that support the embodiment thesis and
that an open collaboration with neuroscientists may help
the field converge on a shared model of an embodied
cognitive architecture, its selective grounding of know-
ledge, and its responsiveness to change.
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